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S. 1232-A LATE ENTRY IN THE RACE
FOR MALPRACTICE REFORM
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST* AND THOMAS B. METZLOFF**
I
INTRODUCTION
The field is growing in the race to take federal action to reform the law of
medical malpractice.' Most of the entries are running under similar
Republican colors, however. 2 They also bear a family resemblance in being
generally concerned with such things as expanding the use of alternative
methods of dispute resolution, limiting the amount and form of damages,
shortening statutes of limitations, and altering the rule of joint and several
liability. To be sure, each proposal features a different combination of
specific reforms or a different means of getting them adopted by the states.
But none of the initial entries in the federal race has generated great
excitement among followers of the malpractice sport.
The latest entry in the race for federal malpractice reform, however, is a
horse of a more interesting color. S. 1232, the "Medical Injury Compensation
Fairness Act of 1991," was introduced on June 6, 1991, by Senator Pete V.
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1. See, for example, Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of
1991, S 1123, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (May 22, 1991) (proposal of the Bush administration, introduced
by Sen. Orrin Hatch); Ensuring Access Through Medical Liability Reform Act of 1991, S 489, 102d
Cong, 1st Sess (February 26, 1991) (proposal of the American Medical Association, introduced by
Sen. Orrin Hatch); Medical Malpractice Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, HR 4566, 101st Cong, 2d
Sess (April 19, 1990) (introduced by Rep. Nancy Johnson).
2. None of the bills cited in note 1 has a Democrat as a co-sponsor. Democrats' support of
malpractice reform has been limited, partly because of their preference for more sweeping health
care reform. Republicans, on the other hand, are content to proceed piecemeal, on the theory that
lowering malpractice risks and costs can make both private coverage and expansions of public
programs more affordable, thus addressing the problem of inadequate insurance coverage of the
population.
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Domenici (R., New Mexico).3 This bill would go further than any other
current proposal in using federal power directly to change the legal rights of
health care consumers. One of its purposes is to impose limits on the
damages recoverable in all malpractice cases arising out of care subsidized
directly or indirectly by the federal government. The bill's most radical
feature, however, is its bid to force all such malpractice cases out of the courts
and into alternative forums for resolving disputes. This threatened federal
entry into a sensitive area of plaintiffs' rights and state concern is certain to be
controversial.
Although S. 1232 would be aggressively prescriptive of consumer rights in
the foregoing respects, the bill is also notable for its forbearance in not using
federal power to prescribe the details of all the reforms it would initiate. It
would not, for example, finally specify the actual design of alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") mechanisms, thus opening the field to experimentation
by competing ADR services and ultimately to private choice. Similarly, in
addressing the vagueness and inefficiency of the legal standard of care
traditionally employed in judging negligence in malpractice suits-a problem
that previous legislative initiatives have rarely addressed at all-the bill would
not mandate any particular change in the legal standards currently appearing
in state law. Instead, it would simply indicate the receptivity of the federal
government to alternative standards that might be independently specified
either for federal health care programs or in private contracts between
consumers and health care providers. Thus, even though the purpose of S.
1232 is to effectuate quite radical changes in a dysfunctional legal system, its
method is not to legislate all such changes but to establish a new framework
within which both procedural and substantive rights could evolve through the
efforts and interaction of the parties affected.
We view S. 1232 as a highly constructive entry in the race to find solutions
to some serious problems in American health care. 4 On the one hand, the bill
is notable as an extreme assertion of federal authority, which it exercises by
deeming (or requiring) certain private "agreements" to exist as preconditions
to the enjoyment of valuable federal benefits. In our view, however, an even
more significant feature of the bill is the considerable room it leaves for
parties to such mandatory "agreements" and providers of ADR services to
introduce reforms of their own design, thus altering by private contract
procedural and substantive rights that have heretofore been generally
3. S 1232, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (June 6, 1991). Senator Domenici's effort has been publicly
endorsed by C. Everett Koop, M.D., former Surgeon General of the United States. See Pete V.
Domenici & C. Everett Koop, Sue the Doctor? There's a Better Way, NY Times A25 (June 6, 1991).
Sections 3 and 6 of S 1232 are set forth in the Appendix. These and other sections are cited
parenthetically in this article. Section 4 of the bill is omitted because it so closely corresponds in
structure and substance to section 3, while applying to a different category of malpractice cases.
Unless otherwise indicated, cited subdivisions of section 3 have counterparts in section 4.
4. Our general views on some of the topics discussed in this article appear in our respective
individual contributions to this symposium. See Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal
Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 L & Contemp Probs 87 (Spring 1991); Thomas B. Metzloff,
Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54 L & Contemp Probs 43 (Winter 1991).
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prescribed by the legal system alone. This move to endow the private sector
with the freedom to create new procedures and different legal relationships is
emphasized in much of the discussion that follows. Because the paradigm
that has previously dominated decision making on medical care issues in the
United States has generally curtailed the role of consumer choice, 5 the explicit
recognition and exploitation of the contractual character of health care in
Senator Domenici's bill should be especially highlighted. Indeed, the idea of
expanding the effective realm of private choice might be usefully incorporated
in federal proposals that seek more general reform of American health care.
II
OVERVIEW OF S. 1232
Unlike other federal malpractice reform proposals, S. 1232 would bypass
state law in several important respects, directly imposing a federal solution in
an area that has traditionally been governed solely by the states. There are
several reasons why Congress might override federalism concerns and take
preemptive federal action. First, Congress might perceive that malpractice
law raises health care costs that the federal government bears directly through
its own financing programs or indirectly through tax subsidies to the private
sector. Congress might also believe that national uniformity is necessary in
order that some federal beneficiaries do not enjoy more extensive (and
expensive) tort rights than others solely by virtue of their place of residence. 6
Moreover, some members of Congress might appreciate that the attempts
made in other proposals to coerce the states to incorporate federally
prescribed reforms in state legislation are hardly less offensive to federalism
than direct preemption. 7
S. 1232 divides patients and providers into three categories for purposes
of prescribing or influencing their future legal rights and responsibilities. In
the first category are persons who receive or provide care that is paid for
directly by the federal government. The second category comprises everyone
engaged in health care arrangements the cost of which is a tax-deductible
business expense for a private employer. The third category is everyone else.
Because the federal government's relationship to the health care transaction
differs in the three cases, they are addressed in separate sections of the bill.
5. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm of Medical Care: Obstacle to
Decentralization, 30 Jurimetrics J 415 (1990).
6. Congress might also wish that its payments to providers did not have to be adjusted to
reflect geographic differences in malpractice climates. See Physician Payment Review Comm'n, 1991
Annual Report to Congress 71-89 (1991) (discussing adjustments to physician fee schedule to reflect
malpractice expense). Uniform legal rules do not necessarily yield uniform malpractice costs,
however, because of other variables affecting the frequency and severity of claims.
7. The Bush administration's bill (S 1123, cited in note I) would deny Medicaid payments to
states that do not adopt its reforms. In addition to intruding upon state sovereignty, this method of
achieving the federal purpose holds hostage the state's Medicaid beneficiaries, making them innocent
pawns in a game in which they have little to gain.
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With respect to substantive matters, however, the first two categories are
treated almost identically.
Section 3 of S. 1232 applies to "any person accepting or providing health
care to be paid for, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, with funds made
available under .. .any .. .Federal Act." 8 All patients and providers thus
reached by section 3 "shall be deemed to have agreed to participate in the
Federal medical dispute resolution program established under this Act for the
purpose of fairly and quickly resolving claims against health care providers for
personal injury arising from care rendered under [any such Federal Act]."
Participation in the "Federal medical dispute resolution program" has several
consequences.
The most important reform that would be wrought by the dispute
resolution program spelled out in section 3 of the bill is a requirement
(§§ 3(b)(1), (5)) that all covered malpractice claims must be submitted for
final resolution (subject to only limited appeal rights9 ) to a public or private
dispute resolution service certified by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS). The bill sets forth basic procedures for filing claims
(§§ 3(b)(2)-(4)) and incorporates state statutes of limitations while also
introducing its own eight-year statute of repose (§ 3(c)). Later discussion
explores the dimensions and implications of the procedural revolution that
these and other provisions of the bill would accomplish.
The only substantive reforms that would be effected directly by the bill are
the limits it would impose on the damages that can be recovered on a
malpractice claim that is subject to its terms (§ 3(e)). Here, however, the bill
does not differ much from several other pending proposals or from reforms
that have been adopted by a number of state legislatures. Noneconomic
damages would be capped at $250,000 (unindexed) or at any lower level
provided in state law. The bill also provides for deducting amounts receivable
from collateral sources-without any exception for, say, victim-purchased life,
disability, or health insurance but with subrogation rights of collateral sources
apparently preserved."' Whenever the total damages awarded exceed
$100,000, amounts intended to cover future expenses or losses would have to
come in the form of periodic payments. In a unique provision, the bill would
allow the award of punitive damages above the cap on noneconomic damages,
but only if they are payable to the state (not the claimant) pursuant to a state
8. The apparent intention is not only to reach care covered by the Medicare and Medicaid
programs but also to affect patient/provider relationships established in the federal employees
health benefits program, in facilities maintained for veterans, in federally supported community
health centers, and under other federal health care initiatives.
9. The limited appeal rights specified in the bill (§ 3(b)(5)) are adapted from the Federal
Arbitration Act. 9 USC § 10 (1991).
10. The bill specifies that anyone suing over an injury (including a subrogee or a spouse suing
for loss of consortium) would be bound by the injured patient's supposed agreement to arbitrate the
claim (§ 3(a)).
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plan to use them in "monitoring, disciplining, and educating health care
providers." The bill says nothing about joint and several liability.' 1
Although section 3 of S. 1232 speaks of providers and patients having
"agreed to participate in the Federal medical dispute resolution program,"
such supposed agreements are obviously not voluntary in any meaningful
sense. Comparable compulsion also appears in the bill's method of reaching
care rendered under privately financed health care plans. Here Congress's
constitutional authority springs not from its power to condition federal
spending but from its power to tax.1 2 Section 4 of the bill would amend
section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986' 3 in such a way as to
disallow an employer's tax deduction for the cost of an employee health
benefits plan "unless the employees covered by such plan have entered into
agreements" that create a legal regime almost identical to the dispute
resolution program created in section 3 of the bill. 14 Thus, provision would
have to be made for ADR and for limiting damages as outlined above.
The Domenici bill reflects a preference for tying the bill's requirements to
the employer's tax deduction over the alternative approach of attaching
conditions to the exclusion of employer-paid premiums from the taxable
income of employees. Although the latter approach would have allowed
employees to decide individually whether to accept the new arrangement, the
approach chosen may be more attractive politically because it would not so
overtly coerce employees to accept a cutback of what many of them perceive
to be valuable rights. Employers, however, despite approving the reform
objectives of the bill, have restrained their enthusiasm for it largely because it
shifts the political burden to them in dealing with their workers.1 5 Another
reason for the choice may have been a belief that it would ensure wider
adherence to the new regime. But the alternative approach of conditioning
employee tax benefits might actually reach farther because it would
encompass the many employees of tax-exempt employers.
11. In this connection, we would recommend inserting the following new paragraph in the
subsection on damages (§ 3(e)):
(4) in a case where the claimant has previously settled voluntarily with a party who is
jointly and severally liable for the injury, the damages for such injury awarded against a
second party liable for the injury shall be apportioned according to the degree of that
party's fault as expressly determined in resolving the dispute.
Because this provision would not abolish joint and several liability, a plaintiff would not have to sue
every possible tortfeasor or establish the degree of responsibility of each negligent party. But
neither could a plaintiff hope to settle with one party and then recover full damages, less the amount
of the settlement, from other tortfeasors.
12. We have not addressed the constitutional questions that might be raised concerning the bill,
preferring to address the policy issues alone.
13. Many tax experts would probably object in principle to using the tax code to accomplish
such substantive policy objectives. Nevertheless, the bill's approach may accomplish two tactical
objectives-highlighting the large federal tax subsidy to private health plans and obtaining a hearing
before the Senate Finance Committee rather than the possibly less receptive Committee on Labor
and Human Resources.
14. See note 3.
15. Letter from Mary Jane England, President, Washington Business Group on Health, to
Senator Domenici, May 20, 1991 (copy on file with authors).
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Although S. 1232 does not attempt to mandate acceptance of the new
regime by those persons whose health care is not subsidized by the federal
government, it does condition a provider's general eligibility to participate in
Medicare and Medicaid on the making of "a good faith effort to enter into
agreements with [such persons] . . . to provide for the resolution of medical
injury claims" (§ 5). The bill requires the Secretary of HHS to promulgate
standard form contracts to accomplish the desired objective.
One might ask why the Domenici bill does not take the simpler approach
of directly preempting state law with respect to medical injuries, relying on
Congress's constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce.
Nevertheless, although S. 1232 may seem to struggle to find nexuses for
forcing individuals to accept new legal rights, the approach it adopts-
deeming or requiring certain agreements to exist-nods helpfully in the
direction of consumer choice as expressed in private contracts. Although the
bill would prescribe some very important choices by law, its reliance in other
respects on the contractual character of consumer/provider/payer
relationships is, as noted earlier, one of its main strengths. Adoption by
Congress of a direct preemptive approach, assuming its constitutionality,
might easily undercut not merely federalism but the basically private,
contractual character of much American health care.
III
MANDATING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION WHILE ALLOWING
FLEXIBILITY IN ITS DESIGN
S. 1232 is a bold attempt to impose mandatory and binding ADR for the
great majority of medical malpractice claims. But even though various
procedural alternatives have been used in malpractice cases in the past,
experience with binding ADR has been limited, and its utility is unproved.
What then might justify the leap of faith in ADR that is inherent in the
Domenici proposal?
A. The Benefits of ADR
There are many reasons why binding ADR might be considered an
improvement over the current method of resolving malpractice claims. For
example, the high cost of litigation in the courts strongly suggests that
substantial cost savings could be achieved by shortening hearings and
otherwise simplifying the litigation process. Similarly, binding ADR should
be capable of speeding the final resolution of claims-a great benefit to
claimants-by avoiding bottlenecks that exist in many court systems and by
obviating most appeals. Mandatory ADR administered by selected ADR
providers should also be capable of yielding results that are more reliable and
more predictable, especially with respect to the amount of damages, than
decisions of layjuries. Greater predictability of outcomes would seem in turn
to facilitate more and fairer settlements, although it is also possible that the
lower costs and quicker results associated with ADR would actually cause
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more cases to be litigated. In any event, it seems to us that Congress could
reasonably conclude that, whatever the actual results of mandatory binding
ADR in terms of cost, speed, and quality of claims resolution, they will
probably be preferable on average to the results now being obtained. It must
be admitted, nevertheless, that the Domenici proposal is based more on
theory and instinct than on hard evidence-just as continued adherence to the
jury system is justified primarily by tradition and the testimonials of trial
lawyers.
Enthusiasm for mandatory binding ADR may also be justified by its
potential for improving claimants' access to legal services and the legal
system. 16 Lower litigation costs could well translate into lower contingent-fee
rates for plaintiffs' lawyers and into a greater willingness of some lawyers to
accept cases in which the potential award is not large. Although malpractice
reform is often seen only as harming potential plaintiffs, an ADR system might
prove more receptive to valid claims, bringing more cases of negligence to
light than does the current system.' 7 In addition, ADR services might
advertise to attract claims and provide neutral experts, sparing claimants the
cost of hiring their own expert witnesses. Even if the overall cost of medical
liability would not decline under the Domenici bill, the public would almost
certainly get better value for the money it spends and better protection
against medical injuries.
An additional possible basis for sharing S. 1232's faith in mandatory ADR
is belief in its strategy of creating a market for ADR services and affording
competing ADR providers the power and flexibility they need to structure
attractive programs. Although it might appear that such a market exists
already and that any benefits of ADR can be realized by its voluntary use,
experience reveals impediments to its widespread voluntary adoption. There
are only limited opportunities, mostly in health maintenance organizations,
for patients and providers to enter into binding agreements concerning the
handling of future disputes. Moreover, once a dispute has arisen, the number
of adversarial interests involved in the case, particularly the individual
interests and biases of the lawyers concerned, make it exceedingly difficult for
the parties to reach an agreement to use ADR. 18 Thus, the current market for
16. A possible barrier to access by would-be claimants to a largely private ADR system is the cost
of operating the system, which, unlike most costs of the judicial system, would not be borne publicly.
S. 1232 would solve this problem in a unique and interesting way. While requiring the losing party
to pay such costs, the bill would eliminate the potential access-limiting burden on unsuccessful
claimants by requiring a losing claimant's attorney to pay them "if such attorney's fee for
representing the claimant is contingent in whole or in part on achieving a successful outcome"
(§ 30)). Thus, the risk of ADR costs associated with unsuccessful claims would be shared by all
claimants and finally borne by the successful ones-in the same way that the legal costs of
unsuccessful claims are shared through the contingent-fee system.
17. The bill finds that "as many as 15 out of 16 persons injured due to medical negligence never
get compensation through the current medical malpractice system" (§ 2(a)(3)). Authority for this
assertion is found in Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury,
Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York 6 (Harvard U Press, 1990).
18. See, for example, US Gen Acct'g Office, Medical Malpractice: Few Claims Resolved Through
Michigan's Voluntary Arbitration Program (December 1990) (legislation to encourage voluntary binding
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ADR is afflicted by high transaction costs and market failures that often
prevent the parties from reaching efficient agreements. The Domenici bill
would take the radical step of presuming or requiring the existence of
agreements to use ADR while leaving the parties free to specify the particulars
of the ADR scheme if they find the arbitration framework specified in the
statute to be unsuitable. We see this strategy as having few downside risks
and as offering many benefits to litigants and the health care system as a
whole.
B. The Benefits of a Dynamic Market for ADR Services
Under S. 1232, covered malpractice disputes would be resolved pursuant
to rules promulgated by freestanding dispute resolution services selected by
the parties. 19 The bill's assumption that there will be a multiplicity of ADR
providers operating in lieu of the monolithic court system is critical to
understanding its potential impact. Prior proposals to use ADR in
malpractice cases have either contemplated creation of a new adjudicative
system under governmental auspices or specified in detail the arbitration
procedures that must be used. The Domenici bill is distinctive in both
tolerating a multiplicity of ADR services and allowing each service substantial
freedom to develop and employ its own procedures.
Tolerating multiple providers may seem problematical in trading the
existing court system, a known institutional commodity, for a collection of
unknown entities. The growth of ADR in the past decade, however, has
spawned a growing number of reputable private dispute resolution services.
The existing pool of potential providers of ADR for malpractice cases and its
potential for further growth should make the Domenici proposal feasible,
particularly since the ADR requirement would apply only to health care
provided, not claims filed, after its effective date (§ 8(a)). Nevertheless, many
fledgling ADR organizations have little experience in handling malpractice
claims, and too sudden an influx of demand might produce poor
performance. Also, providers and consumers might rush into agreements
with unproved ADR providers or with the few already established services,
thus discouraging entry by new (especially nonprofit) organizations.
Organizations with vested interests in the outcomes of malpractice cases-
such as trial lawyers' organizations or state medical societies-might be
quickest to organize ADR services, raising questions about their neutrality.
arbitration produced only 247 actual arbitrations out of approximately 20,000 malpractice claims in
thirteen years).
19. Under the bill, a claimant may initiate a claim by filing it with any certified ADR service and
by providing notice to the health care provider against whom the claim is being made (§ 3(b)(2)). If,
however, there is an agreement to use a particular service, the claim must be filed with it (§ 3(b)(3)).
Provision is also made for claims against multiple providers where there are inconsistent agreements
on which ADR service to use (§ 3(b)(4)). Because the bill gives the claimant a free choice of ADR
services in the absence of an agreement, it encourages providers to seek prior agreements
designating a particular service.
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For these reasons, the bill's effective date might be delayed somewhat longer
than is contemplated.
To address concerns about the neutrality and competence of ADR
providers-both during the development of a malpractice ADR industry and
after an industry has had time to develop-the bill limits use to ADR
providers certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.2 0 The
clear intention, however, is that the Secretary will certify as many services as
meet the bill's relatively straightforward requirements (§§ 6(a)(2), (3)).
Under the certification requirements, an applicant must demonstrate
expertise in administering ADR procedures, employ methods of selecting
arbitrators that insure their neutrality, and disclose its funding sources.
Taken collectively, these requirements represent an enlightened approach to
the challenge of ensuring high-quality ADR services while also encouraging
innovation and competition. 2'
Employing multiple ADR providers would make little difference if the bill
mandated detailed ADR procedures. The bill's basic approach, however, is to
describe a rudimentary arbitration procedure for use when the parties have
not agreed upon an alternative. This "default mode" arbitration procedure is
only a backstop, not a legislatively prescribed ideal. The bill's rules governing
the arbitration are minimal, requiring only that ADR providers' rules give the
parties (1) a period of discovery, (2) a right to a hearing conducted before a
three-person arbitration panel "with expertise in medical injury disputes,"
and (3) a right to a written decision rendered within six months after the claim
was filed (§ 6(a)(4)). (All rights are waivable or variable if the parties agree, of
course.) The bill's spartan approach is unusual; other proposals to employ
ADR methods have attempted to define a "better way" to resolve malpractice
disputes by anticipating all procedural questions that might arise.
The outward simplicity of S. 1232 masks a sophisticated policy decision to
foster competition among ADR services, broad flexibility in the design and
use of ADR methods, and implementation of reforms by private contract.
Several points deserve mention. First, although the bill requires use of a
three-person arbitration panel in the absence of an agreement to employ a
different model, it is notable for not prescribing the specific make-up of the
panel. Other proposals would require, for example, that an ADR panel
include a health care professional. S. 1232 would leave a certified ADR
service quite free to structure panels and selection processes as it sees fit.
20. The bill does permit the Secretary to waive the certification criteria for state-sponsored ADR
services (§ 6(a)).
21. The bill also requires dispute resolution services to have procedures for providing
governmental agencies responsible for disciplining health care providers with information
"regarding evidence of medical injury and the causes of such injuries" (§ 6(a)(1)). Currently, that
reporting function is performed by liability insurers. See Ilene D. Johnson, Reports to the National
Practitioner Data Bank, 265 J Am Med Ass'n 407, 407-08 (January 16, 1991) (description of federal
reporting requirements). It is unclear whether the bill's reporting requirement is meant to
supplement or replace existing systems. Duplicative reporting should of course be avoided.
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Second, the bill is notable in neither writing in nor excluding particular
procedural reforms. Despite the obvious temptation to mandate currently
fashionable procedural innovations, the bill would leave individual ADR
providers unconstrained in many respects. Even in structuring the arbitration
system to be used in default of an agreed-upon alternative, ADR services
would have flexibility with respect to such matters as (1) selecting arbitrators;
(2) assigning them to particular panels; (3) controlling the timing, amount, or
type of discovery permitted; (4) requiring pre-hearing conferences; (5) using
neutral expert witnesses; (6) prescribing the length of hearings; and (7)
establishing evidentiary rules.
Another manifestation of the bill's receptivity to innovations is its unique
requirement that an ADR provider demonstrate "an ability to advise parties to
a dispute regarding alternatives to the basic dispute resolution approach and
to carry out such alternative procedures" if the parties agree to their use
(§ 6(a)(5)). Numerous consensual departures from the bill's default model of
arbitration can be visualized. For example, requiring a panel of three
arbitrators may add unnecessary expense in small-stakes cases or in cases
involving only simple factual issues or a contest over the amount of damages.
Parties also might agree to a shorter hearing than the ADR service's rules
provide. In other cases, the parties could bifurcate the case and submit only
one or more issues-liability, causation, or damages-to the arbitrators. The
bill also clearly encourages ADR providers to advise the parties to consider
such other ADR methods as mediation, nonbinding arbitration, early neutral
evaluation, and summary jury trials, each one of which is available in a
number of different formats. 22 Not only would the bill permit customizing
procedures for particular disputes, but it would actively promote such options
by specifically requiring the ADR provider to possess expertise in using them.
These affirmative recognitions of the benefits of diversity in ADR are well
calculated to achieve the goal of efficiency in resolving malpractice claims.
The Domenici bill provides a welcome contrast to other ADR proposals
that have offered merely a substitute vision of how malpractice cases should
be resolved. These earlier ADR proposals, rather than inviting innovation,
have in fact been more restrictive than the current system, which allows
litigants at least theoretical freedom to control much of the conduct of the
litigation or to negotiate a method of ADR. The Domenici proposal reveals a
clear and justified preference for giving ADR providers and their clients
maximum flexibility in resolving claims.
IV
INVITING CONSENSUAL MODIFICATIONS OF LIABILITY RULES
Several other provisions in S. 1232 are equally consistent with the notion
that consumers and providers of health services can safely exercise some
choice with respect to their legal rights and obligations. These provisions
22. See, for example, Metzloff, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 104-14 (cited in note 4).
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contemplate and explicitly invite privately negotiated variations in the
substantive standards by which liability is determined. Section 3 of the bill
provides that liability on all claims subject to its terms would be governed by
state law except insofar as (1) the Secretary of HHS provides otherwise by
regulation for federally reimbursed care or (2) an organized health plan
serving federally supported subscribers contracts with them to provide care
meeting a different standard (§ 3(d)). A similar provision, allowing the
adoption of different standards for care rendered under tax-subsidized
employee benefit plans, appears in section 4. Under both sections 3 and 4,
however, any alternative test for liability that is adopted would have to fall
within one of several specified general categories.
The optional types of tests that could be used under S. 1232 for
determining the compensability of injuries have significant implications for
overall health policy. Each represents a different way of reducing liability
risks under prevailing tort doctrine in order to facilitate responsible
economizing in the provision of health services. Under section 4 of the bill,
for example, health plans of private employers would be authorized to
"specify an alternative standard to govern care rendered under the plan."2 3
Thus, the bill expressly confirms the contractual freedom of consumers,
acting through private health plans, to elect a clearer, more cost-conscious,
and possibly less demanding standard of care. Until this freedom is clearly
recognized by the courts-as it generally is not today-consumers will be
unable effectively to authorize physicians to depart from customary medical
practice, which is the traditional benchmark for judging physician liability.
Customary medical practice, in addition to being ill-defined and highly
variable, has been shown to be scientifically or economically questionable in
many instances. Thus, there are good reasons why consumers, physicians,
and organized health plans might choose a different standard to govern
liability for future medical injuries. 24
Sections 3 and 4 of S. 1232 also authorize specification of the
qualifications of expert witnesses who can testify as to whether the applicable
standard of care was met in a given case (§ 3(d)(2)). This is a way in which the
deljure standard of care might at least be made more predictable.
The Domenici bill further endorses private adoption of alternative liability
tests by authorizing the incorporation by reference, in both public and private
health plans, of practice guidelines certified by the Secretary of HHS
(§ 3(d)(1)). Such guidelines are currently being developed by a wide variety
23. This option of specifying a clearer and possibly less demanding general standard of care
would not, for some reason, be granted to the Secretary of HHS, however. Nor could private health
plans adopt it for federal beneficiaries or federal employees who voluntarily enroll. This is almost
the only substantive difference between sections 3 and 4 of the bill.
24. For a discussion of possible alternative formulations of the general standard of care that
might be incorporated in private contracts as a way of escaping ill-defined and inappropriate
standards that induce the practice of "defensive medicine," see Havighurst, Altering the Applicable
Standard of Care, 49 L & Contemp Probs 265, 267, 273 (Spring 1986) (suggesting "reasonable and
prudent" practice as a test or possibly limiting liability to cases of "gross negligence," suitably
defined).
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of professional and research organizations as a way of strengthening the
scientific base of medical practice. The Secretary of HHS is charged in S.
1232 with certifying practice guidelines that appear to be objective and up to
date and that are supported by proper documentation, including justifications
of the choices made (§ 6(b)(1)). The Secretary is to certify, not a single,
official set of guidelines, 25 but any guidelines that meet these general
standards. If some of these guidelines take account of cost considerations-
that is, trade-offs between the marginal benefits and marginal costs of
particular measures in particular circumstances-consumers will possess a
whole new set of practical tools for making explicit, enforceable economizing
choices in purchasing health services. 26 Under S. 1232, these tools could also
be used to assure physicians that economizing in accordance the contract
would not expose them to tort liability.
S. 1232 authorizes still another type of voluntary reform of the medical
malpractice system. Under its terms, both public and private health plans
would be permitted to reject fault as the basis for liability and to substitute an
arrangement by which certain injuries would be compensated automatically
(§ 3(d)(3)). Such alternative methods of compensation must be certified by
the Secretary, however. Certification criteria set forth in the bill seek to
ensure that incentives to maintain the quality of care are preserved,
presumably by requiring the premiums of provider-purchased insurance to be
experience-rated to reflect the outcomes actually achieved (§ 6(b)(2)). The
bill would also require that the financial protection given consumers be "at
least comparable, on an actuarial basis, to the legal protections they would
otherwise enjoy." A number of proposals for "no-fault" compensation
systems have been made in recent years. 27 The Domenici bill is an invitation
to the private sector to consider these options as replacements for the costly
and dysfunctional legal system that now dictates patient/provider
relationships.
The reason why the Domenici bill is so noteworthy for inviting contractual
reforms of malpractice rights is that private contracts have not heretofore
been commonly thought of as legitimate vehicles for altering legal rules in this
area.28 Yet virtually all Americans are troubled by the high cost of state-of-
25. Although the Secretary may select a single set of guidelines to govern all care for which the
federal government pays directly (§ 3(d)(l)), his certification of guidelines for possible use by
organized health plans would not be so restrictive. Even with respect to guidelines selected for
federal programs, exceptions may be authorized by the Secretary where "geographic or other factors
affecting the availability of resources to meet health care needs may warrant some variation from an
otherwise uniform standard" (id).
26. For expositions of the notion that practice guidelines should be certified by government and
used as tools for clarifying and perhaps modifying patient entitlements and provider and payer
obligations, see Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 St Louis
LJ 777 (1990); Havighurst, 54 L & Contemp Probs 87 (cited in note 4).
27. For example, Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility for Patient
Injury: Accelerated-Compensation Events, A Malpractice and Quality Reform Ripe for a Test, 54 L & Contemp
Probs 147 (Spring 1991).
28. See generally Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find Relief?, 49 L &
Contemp Probs 1, 143-320 (Spring 1986).
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the-art health care and by the inability of many persons, including many
employed persons, to obtain health care coverage at affordable prices. A
major reason why good low-cost coverage is unavailable is the legal system's
insistence on dictating a single standard to govern the health care of all
citizens 29 and its inability to define a standard that reflects essential trade-offs
and induces efficient medical practice. Consumers, on the other hand, have
been unable to specify in contracts precisely what they do and do not wish to
purchase from health care providers on a prepaid basis. In addition to the
immense practical difficulty of spelling out patient entitlements and provider
duties in enforceable terms (a problem that practice guidelines may overcome
in time), private contracts have generally not been viewed as useful
instruments of consumer choice. Instead, they have been seen primarily as
vehicles by which powerful payers or providers can exploit consumer
ignorance and deny desirable care. Enactment of the Domenici bill would go
far toward legitimizing private economizing initiatives that courts are now too
inclined to view with suspicion. A Congress that does not want to take upon
itself the responsibility for rationing health care to the American people ought
to view private contracts as a welcome means of empowering federally
subsidized consumers to make some economizing choices for themselves.
V
CONCLUSION
We have written this article in order to call wider attention to S. 1232,
which we view as a notable new entry in what has heretofore promised to be
an unexciting race to use the influence of the federal government to reduce
the burdens of medical malpractice law on both consumers and providers of
health care. We have presented the bill primarily as an invitation to private
health plans to broker contracts between providers and consumers that
customize the procedures and substantive rules to be used in determining
liability for medical injuries. Instead of being bound by law to accept costly
procedural and substantive rights of doubtful value and inefficient standards
of medical care borrowed from the medical profession and made mandatory
under applicable state law, parties to various health care arrangements would
receive under S. 1232 strong encouragement to elect to be governed by a
legal regime of their own making. The various alternative procedures and
substantive rights among which they might choose would be made credible by
the oversight provided by the Secretary of HHS under general certification
criteria supplied in the bill.
S. 1232 may be too innovative to be enacted in its present form. On the
other hand, we see immense potential for combining its encouragement of
private reform of poorly designed, cost-increasing malpractice rights with
other federal proposals that seek to make good-quality health care accessible
29. See generally John A. Siciliano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malpractice Standard, 77
Va L Rev 439 (1991).
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to all Americans at reasonable cost. Only if private economizing choices of
the kind visualized here are facilitated and accepted by the legal system will
the nation's future health care bill accurately reflect consumers' individual
willingness, and the nation's collective ability, to pay.
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APPENDIX
SECTIONS 3 AND 6 OF S. 1232, 102D CONG., IST SESS (1991)
SEC. 3. FEDERAL MEDICAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM.
(a) AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE.-Any person accepting or
providing health care to be paid for, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly,
with funds made available under the Social Security Act, the Public Health
Service Act, or any other Federal Act shall be deemed to have agreed to
participate in the Federal medical dispute resolution program established
under this Act for the purpose of fairly and quickly resolving claims against
health care providers for personal injury arising from care rendered under
such Acts. Such agreement to participate shall be binding on any person
making such a claim and shall be enforceable in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
(b) MANDATORY RESOLUTION OF CLAIMS THROUGH CERTIFIED
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICE.-
(1) REQUIREMENT.-When an agreement is deemed to exist under
subsection (a), any claim of the type referred to in that subsection that is
not settled voluntarily by the parties thereto shall be resolved only
through a dispute resolution service that has been certified under section
6.
(2) PROCEDURES.-A person having a claim of the type referred to
in subsection (a) may initiate the procedures to resolve such claim
through a dispute resolution service by-
(A) filing a claim with a dispute resolution service then appearing
on the applicable list of such services maintained by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services under section 6; and
(B) providing notice of such filing ... to the provider or providers
against whom the claim is made.
(3) AGREEMENT TO USE SPECIFIC SERVICE.- If the person
filing a claim under this section and the provider against whom such
claim is filed agree or have previously agreed to use a particular dispute
resolution service to resolve such claim, the claim shall be filed with that
service.
(4) CLAIMS AGAINST MORE THAN ONE PROVIDER.-If a claim
is made against more than one provider, such providers shall have not
more than 30 days to agree that the claim will be resolved by any dispute
resolution service to which the claimant has agreed with any one of such
providers.
(5) RESOLUTION.-Once properly filed, a claim under this section
shall be resolved by the dispute resolution service selected, under
procedures prescribed by such service. The decision of the dispute
resolution service with respect to a claim under this section shall be final
and not subject to further review by any court, except that a party to a
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dispute may obtain review of the decision on any of the following
grounds in any court of competent jurisdiction in the State wherein the
decision was made:
(A) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means.
(B) There was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the
arbiter.
(C) The arbiter was guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any
misbehavior by which the rights of any party were prejudiced.
(D) The arbiter exceeded its powers or so imperfectly executed
them that a final and definite award upon the claim was not made.
Where an award is vacated under this paragraph, the court shall direct
that the matter shall be reheard by another arbiter under the procedures
prescribed by the dispute resolution service.
(c) LIMITATIONS.-No claim of the type referred to in subsection (a)
may be filed with a dispute resolution service after the expiration of any
applicable time limitation as prescribed in State law, and in no event, except
in the case of fraudulent concealment of relevant facts by the provider against
whom the claim is made, may such a claim be brought in any forum more than
8 years after the date of the occurrence of the incident that gave rise to the
claim.
(d) STANDARD FOR IMPOSING LIABILITY.- Liability for any claim
that is subject to resolution under subsection (b) shall be determined under
the standard of care prescribed under applicable State law, except that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services may determine . . . and any
organized health plan in which beneficiaries may voluntarily enroll may
provide by contract, that-
(1) particular services shall be rendered in accordance with identified
medical practice guidelines that have been certified pursuant to section
6(b), in which case such guidelines shall, to the extent applicable, be
deemed to supply the standard of care to be employed in determining
liability (the Secretary may determine that geographic or other factors
affecting the availability of resources to meet health care needs may
warrant some variation from an otherwise uniform standard supplied by
such guidelines);
(2) any expert witnesses testifying as to whether the applicable
standard of care was met must possess specified qualifications; or
(3) certain personal injuries and other losses resulting from specified
services or procedures shall be compensated without regard to provider
fault if such alternative method of compensation has been certified by the
Secretary pursuant to section 6(b).
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(e) DAMAGES.-When a claim that is subject to resolution under
subsection (b) results in a finding of liability, the damages awarded to the
claimant shall be determined and awarded as follows-
(1) awards for noneconomic damages shall be limited to
$250,000 ... ;
(2) awards shall be reduced for any collateral source payments to
which the patient is entitled for the medical injury for which the claim was
filed;
(3) in the case of an award in excess of $100,000, claimants shall
accept periodic payment of the amount of such awards that are intended
to compensate the claimant for damages expected to be incurred in the
future such as lost income and medical expenses; and
(4) an award for punitive damages shall not be paid to the claimant,
but shall instead be paid to the State if the State has submitted a plan to
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary has
approved such a plan, to use such funds to improve the monitoring,
disciplining, and educating of health care providers in the State to ensure
they meet standards of competency.
(f) COSTS.-The party against whom a claim, that is subject to resolution
under subsection (b), is substantially resolved (an issue to be expressly
determined in resolving the dispute) shall pay the charges assessed by the
dispute resolution service for resolving the claim (if any such charges are
assessed), except that-
(1) any such charges payable by the claimant shall be paid in fact by
the claimant's attorney if such attorney's fee for representing the claimant
is contingent in whole or in part on achieving a successful outcome; and
(2) a claimant who is not represented by an attorney and who
demonstrates an inability to pay such charges (according to criteria
specified by the Secretary in regulations) shall be entitled to have liability
for such charges (including any filing fees) waived by the dispute
resolution service.
SEC. 6. CERTIFICATION.
(a) ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES.-Not later
than 12 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services shall promulgate regulations that establish the
criteria and procedures by which the Secretary (or persons to whom the
Secretary has delegated such authority) will determine whether or not to
certify an alternative dispute resolution service, except that the Secretary may
waive such criteria and procedures in certifying dispute resolution services
sponsored by the States. The regulations shall include (but are not limited to)
provisions requiring such services to-
(1) have procedures in place for providing to the Federal and State
agencies responsible for monitoring or disciplining health care providers
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standardized information and data regarding evidence of medical injury
and the causes of such injuries;
(2) maintain a roster of qualified and independent arbitrators willing
to resolve medical injury disputes pursuant to the rules established by the
service;
(3) demonstrate neutrality by disclosing funding sources and
selection methods used for obtaining arbitrators in resolving medical
injury disputes;
(4) demonstrate administrative expertise and an ability to conduct
dispute resolution procedures that is consistent with a basic dispute
resolution procedure which shall include-
(A) decisionmaking by a three person arbitration panel with
expertise in medical injury disputes;
(B) a period to permit the discovery of evidence;
(C) the right to a hearing;
(D) the right to a decision not later than 6 months after the date on
which the claim was filed; and
(E) the right to a written decision; and
(5) require administrative expertise and an ability to advise parties to
a dispute regarding alternatives to the basic dispute resolution approach
and to carry out such alternative procedures if all parties to a dispute
agree to one of the alternative procedures.
(b) STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LIABILITY.-Not later than 12
months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services shall promulgate regulations that-
(1) establish the criteria to be used for the certification of medical
practice guidelines by the Secretary (or persons to whom the Secretary
has delegated such authority), including criteria to ensure that such
guidelines-
(A) reflect up-to-date scientific learning and the judgment of
objective experts;
(B) are supported by proper documentation; and
(C) are accompanied by justifications for the standards established;
and
(2) establish the criteria to be used for the certification by the
Secretary (or persons to whom the Secretary has delegated such
authority) of alternative methods of compensating personal injuries and
other losses without regard to provider fault, including criteria to ensure
that such alternative methods would-
(A) be administered fairly and efficiently;
(B) preserve incentives to maintain the quality of care; and
(C) generally give health care consumers financial protection that is
at least comparable, on an actuarial basis, to the legal protections they
would otherwise enjoy.
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(c) OTHER REGULATIONS.-Not later than 12 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
promulgate other regulations necessary to carry out this Act.

